McCann v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
Nature of the Case
Wal-Mart (D) appealed a decision by the United States District Court denying its post-judgment motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial in McCann’s (P) false imprisonment action. McCann cross-appealed the district court’s pre-trial dismissal of her claim for punitive damages.
Facts
McCann (P) and her two children, aged 16 and 12 were shopping at Wal-Mart (D). As they were leaving the store, two of Wal-Mart’s employees blocked their path to the exit. McCann was told that the children were not allowed to leave the store because they had been caught stealing on a prior occasion.
Despite McCann’s protestations, an employee indicated that the police were being called and that she and her children had to go with her. The employees had not in fact called the police, but sought to detain them until a store security guard could arrive to identify the children. That security officer arrived and determined that the children were wrongfully accused. The family left the store about one hour after the incident started.
The jury awarded the plaintiff $20,000 in compensatory damages for false imprisonment. Wal-Mart appealed and plaintiff cross appealed the denial of punitive damages.
Issue
- Can confinement for false imprisonment be accomplished by a false assertion of legal authority?
Holding and Rule of Law
- Yes. Confinement for false imprisonment can be accomplished by a false assertion of legal authority.
False imprisonment is conduct by the actor which is intended to, and does in fact, confine another within boundaries fixed by the actor where, in addition, the victim is either conscious of the confinement or is harmed by it. While ‘confinement’ can be imposed by physical barriers or physical force, much less will do–although how much less becomes cloudy at the margins. It is generally settled that mere threats of physical force can suffice. The threats may be implicit as well as explicit, and confinement can also be based on a false assertion of legal authority to confine. Confinement may occur by other unspecified means of ‘duress.’
A reasonable jury could conclude that the defendant’s employees intended to ‘confine’ McCann within boundaries fixed by the defendant, that the employees’ acts did result in such a confinement, and that the McCanns were conscious of the confinement. The continued presence of the employees and the fact that they told one child that he could not use the bathroom was enough to induce reasonable people to believe either that they would be restrained physically if they sought to leave, or that the store was claiming lawful authority to confine them until the police arrived, or both.
The defendant claims that actual physical restraint is needed. Taking too literally the phrase ‘actual, physical restraint’ would put Maine law broadly at odds with not only the Restatement but with a practically uniform body of common law in other states that accepts the mere threat of physical force, or a claim of lawful authority to restrain, as enough to satisfy the confinement requirement for false imprisonment.
Plaintiffs contend that the refusal to permit Jonathan to use the bathroom was sufficiently outrageous to support a claim for punitive damages. The denial was not ‘outrageous’ given the failure to press the request.
Disposition
Affirmed.