Day v. Caton
Nature of the Case
This was an action for breach of contract to recover half the value of a wall built between adjoining properties.
Facts
Day (P) built a wall between his land and real estate owned by his neighbor Caton (D). Day claimed that Caton had agreed to pay half the value of the wall. Caton denied that any express agreement had ever been reached.
Day sued for damages and Caton requested the judge to rule that Day could only recover upon a finding of an express contract, and that he would not be obligated to pay if the jury found that he knew Day was building the wall but remained silent. The judge refused such instructions and instead instructed the jury that a promise may be implied from the fact that Day built the wall with Caton’s knowledge, and that if Caton knew that Day assumed he would be paid, the jury could infer a promise by Caton despite his silence.
The jury returned a verdict for Day and Caton appealed.
Issue
- When can silence to an offer create a valid contract?
Holding and Rule of Law
- If a party knowingly accepts valuable services when he has the option to accept or reject them, a promise to pay may be inferred.
Caton contends that the presiding judge incorrectly ruled that such a promise might be inferred from the fact that Day undertook to complete the wall with the expectation of payment from Caton, and Caton having reason to know of these facts allowed him to act without objection. The mere fact that Day expected to be paid would not be sufficient by itself to establish a contract. Assent in some form or manner must be shown. But if a party voluntarily accepts and avails himself of valuable services rendered for his benefit, when he has the option to reject them, a promise to pay may be inferred. The knowledge that the services were valuable and the option to reject them justify this inference.
One who stands in silence and sees valuable services being performed, accompanied by knowledge of the expectation of payment and of which the silent one would necessarily avail himself of that work product, may fairly be charged with acceptance of a contract to pay. Qui tacet consentire videtur applies only to those when the circumstances are such that the party is fairly called upon either to deny or admit his liability. Silence can act as an implied promise to pay when a party knows that a valuable benefit is being rendered on him under the expectation of payment and he accepts the benefit without objection. Silence is assent if the facts require a party to speak. If such facts were merely brought to the attention upon a single occasion and casually, if there was little opportunity to notify the other party and there was no desire for the work to be done, the same inference cannot be made.
Disposition
Affirmed.