Connecticut v. Doehr
Nature of the Case
This was a review of a court order that held a property attachment statute that without prior notice or hearing upon the plaintiff’s verification that there is probable cause to sustain the validity of his or her claim does not violate due process.
Facts
DiGiovanni (D) used a Connecticut statute for prejudgment attachment against Doehr (P) on a potential tort claim. DiGiovanni had sued Doehr for assault and battery and filed an ex parte declaration about the nature of his claim against for a $75,000 attachment against Doehr’s home.
Connecticut law authorizes prejudgment attachment of real estate without affording prior notice or the opportunity for a prior hearing to the individual whose property is subject to the attachment. There was no requirement that DiGiovanni show exigent circumstances for the prejudgment attachment or that he post a bond. The tort suit did not involve Doehr’s house and DiGiovanni had no preexisting interest in the home.
The state court issued the order and Doehr filed this federal suit to attack the constitutionality of the state procedure. The statute does not require DiGiovanni to post a bond to insure payment of damages that the defendant may suffer should the attachment be deemed to be issue wrongly. It is also authorized without prior notice or an opportunity to be heard, but did provide for post issuance hearings. The district court upheld the statute’s validity. That decision was reversed by the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Issue
- Must a prejudgment seizure of real property without notice or an opportunity to be heard consider the private interest that will be affected, the risk of erroneous deprivation, and the probable value of substituted safeguards before it can be declared valid under due process?
Holding and Rule of Law (White)
- Yes. A prejudgment seizure of real property without notice or an opportunity to be heard must consider the private interest that will be affected, the risk of erroneous deprivation, and the probable value of substituted safeguards before it can be declared valid under due process.
Due process, unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances. Due process is violated in permitting ex parte attachment absent a showing of extraordinary circumstances.
Only under extraordinary circumstances may real estate be attached without prior notice or hearing and without a bond posted. To determine what process is due we turn to the balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge to determine if government conduct comports with due process requirements. The relevant inquires involve the consideration of the private interests affected by the attachment, the risk of erroneous deprivation and the value of alternative safeguards, and the prejudgment party’s interests.
Here, the private property interests are significant. The ex parte nature of the proceeding does not take into account the owner’s interest in his property. An attachment will place a severe restriction on the property’s alienability. Credit records may be tainted and an existing mortgage may enter default.
There is a substantial risk of erroneous deprivation under this statute. The self-serving declaration of the private party in the proceeding may allow for erroneous deprivation. The statute only requires a minimal showing of probable cause and any judge reviewing the affidavits cannot make an assessment of the merits based on such one sided conclusory statements made by DiGiovanni.
Doehr did have the opportunity for a post attachment hearing but such a hearing does not cure any temporary deprivation of property that might have occurred. No interest the government may have affects this analysis. A state’s substantive interest in protecting any rights of the plaintiff cannot be any weightier than those rights themselves. DiGiovanni’s interest is de minimis. There was no indication that Doehr was about to transfer or hide ownership of the property to protect himself against any future judgment.
We turn to whether due process requires a bond to be posted. The posting of a bond has utility to protect property rights but it is on substitute or an excuse for the need for a hearing or other safeguards. A bond alone cannot undue the harm from the inability to alienate property. Therefore unless the circumstances are exceptional a bond alone cannot make up for a lack of a prejudgment hearing. The converse is also true.
Disposition
Affirmed.
Concurring (Rehnquist)
Connecticut’s prejudgment attachment on real property does not deprive the defendant of the use or possession of the property. However, this situation is not similar to a mechanic’s lien in that there is no dispute about labor and materials being contributed to the property.
Today’s holding is a significant development in the law. The two elements of due process with which the Court concerns itself — the requirement of a bond, and of exigent circumstances — prove to be upon analysis so vague that the discussion is not only unnecessary, but not particularly useful. Unless one knows what the terms and conditions of a bond are to be, the requirement of a ‘bond’ in the abstract means little.
Concurring (Scalia)
The manner of attachment here was not a recognized procedure at common law. Due process should be determined by applying the test we set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge.