Carey v. Piphus
Facts
Piphus (P) was a student at a Chicago Vocational School and during school hours was observed by the principal smoking what appeared to be marijuana with another student. When the students saw the principal they threw the cigarette into a nearby hedge. Piphus was suspended for 20 days.
Piphus denied smoking marijuana and a hearing was held to explain the purpose of the suspension. Piphus sued Carey (D) under 42 U.S.C. 1983 claiming he was suspended without due process of law.
Another plaintiff, Brisco, was in sixth grade and wore an earring to school contrary to school policy. He refused to remove the earring, claiming it was a symbol of black pride. Brisco was suspended and sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983.
Both cases were consolidated and the District Court found that both students were suspended without procedural due process. The court declined damages in that both plaintiffs did not admit any evidence of damage. The students were given declaratory relief in the form of the deletion of the suspension from their records. The court then dismissed the complaints.
The plaintiffs appealed and the case was reversed and remanded. On appeal the court denied substantial nonpunitive damages because there was no proof of individualized injury to the plaintiffs. The court decided however that plaintiffs were entitled to recover substantial damages to compensate them for the inherent nature of the wrong even though the suspension may be found to be justified. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Issues
- Does a wrong under section 1983 entitle a party to recover substantial, although unspecified, damages to compensate for that wrong as they would under a tort cause of action in which per se damages are recognized?
- Is a plaintiff entitled to an award of nominal damages under 1983 if he has established that the defendant’s conduct violated his constitutional rights?
- Because the right to procedural due process is ‘absolute,’ are nominal damages available for a denial of due process even absent actual injury?
- Are compensatory damages the norm when a plaintiff prevails on a §1983 claim for constitutional violations and can prove actual damages?
Holding and Rule of Law (Powell)
- No. A wrong under section 1983 does not entitle a party to recover substantial, although unspecified, damages to compensate for that wrong as they would under a tort cause of action in which per se damages are recognized.
- Yes. A plaintiff is entitled to an award of nominal damages under 1983 if he has established that the defendant’s conduct violated his constitutional rights.
- Yes. Because the right to procedural due process is absolute, nominal damages are available for denial of due process even absent actual injury.
- Yes. Compensatory damages are the norm when a plaintiff prevails on a §1983 claim for constitutional violations and can prove actual damages.
The legislative history of 1983 demonstrates that it was intended to create a species of tort liability in favor of persons who are deprived of rights, privileges, or immunities secured to them by the Constitution. Petitioners argue that the elements and prerequisites for recovery of damages under this species of tort liability should parallel those for recovery of damages under the common law of torts. They argue that a party should not only have to prove that their rights were violated but also that they injury was caused by that violation in order to recover substantial damages.
Plaintiffs argue that injury fairly may be presumed to flow from every denial of procedural due process. They assert that due process guarantees against unjustified deprivations and the feeling of just treatment by the government. Plaintiffs contend that even when a deprivation is not erroneous there is an injury similar to that of defamation per se and as such they should be relieved from the necessity of producing any proof that they have been injured in order to recover substantial compensatory damages.
The defendants do not deny that a purpose of procedural due process is to convey to the individual a feeling that the government has dealt with them fairly. They even concede with the proper facts that damages for mental and emotional distress would be recoverable if they were caused by the denial of procedural due process. Carey merely contends that such an injury cannot be presumed to occur.
We cannot agree that damages should be presumed to flow from every deprivation of procedural due process. It is not reasonable to assume that every departure from due process is likely to cause distress the way publication of a defamation per se is assumed to cause injury to reputation and distress.
The doctrine of defamation per se is an oddity of tort law because it allows for recovery of purportedly compensatory damages without evidence of actual loss. This is buttressed by difficulties in proof and that such statements are likely to cause mental and emotional distress as well as injury to reputation.
We foresee no particular difficulty in producing evidence that mental and emotional distress actually was caused by the denial of procedural due process itself. Neither the likelihood of such injury nor the difficulty of proving it is so great as to justify awarding compensatory damages without proof that such injury actually existed.
Common law courts have traditionally vindicated deprivations of certain absolute rights that are not shown to have caused injury through the award of a nominal sum of money. Thus injuries caused by deprivation of constitutional rights should be tailored to the interests protected by the particular right in question. This is the same as is found in tort law; common law actions and damages were defined by the interests protected in the various branches of tort law itself.
The plaintiffs are due nominal damages from a violation of procedural due process but substantial damages should be awarded only to compensate actual injury or to deter or punish malicious deprivations of rights. The right to procedural due process is absolute and we believe that the denial of procedural due process should be actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury.
To the extent Congress intended that awards under 1983 should deter the deprivation of constitutional rights, there is no evidence that it meant to establish a deterrent more formidable than that inherent in the award of compensatory damages. The purpose of 1983 would be defeated if injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights went uncompensated simply because the common law does not recognize an analogous cause of action.
Disposition
Reversed.